




Despite distinguishing two very different notions of what time may be, the A and B theories of time inherently share an assumption in definition which has excluded a third field of possible explanation from being recognised and explored. In order to prove this rather grandiose proposition I will introduce a distinction between theories of resulting time and theories of non-resulting time. The clear articulation of why of this distinction is valid will be established by the method of reduction with regards to the construction and evolution of the definition of time in the physics of Aristotle and Einstein. This method reveals precisely the assumption in definition that has been made and carried forth in the defining of time in B theory, and also what has been forgone, being non-resulting theories of time. After such analysis and illustration of the proposed distinction with regards to B theory, it will be obvious that A theories of time dually share the assumption in definition.  Thus having established that this distinction is very much real and that nearly all work in the philosophy and physics of time has thus far fallen into theories of resulting time, I will then demonstrate why new theories of non-resulting time could at the very least ‘quasi-solve’ some of the irreconcilable conflictions that have arisen within opposing theories of resulting time, using as example the A theorists/Presentist’s conflict with Special Relativity. 

1.0 	Resulting and Non-Resulting Time: The Distinction  

Whatever we (a) induct/recognise/conceive, and/or (b) describe/define/express, of (c) actual/objective reality, is necessarily a division made of (c) actual/objective reality. This is because in giving (c), (b) definition/expression, or more simply in (a) recognising/inducting (c) as a particular form, all other definitions or inductions and their possible properties are forgone for the chosen definition. This is important to realise not just because of what that forgone (b) definition/description may itself have been, but also in terms of how that forgone definition could have been manipulated, i.e. by computer-aided math/statistics, so as to yield different truths about (c). Perhaps most importantly we do not want to be stuck with a definition that hides, or limits, our ability to yield truths about (c) actual/objective reality…which I am going to argue is precisely what has happened with regards to our treatment of time in defining it as the A and B theories do. As philosophers of scientific truth it is thus worth considering how in the first instance both science and philosophy have divided (c) actual/objective reality, so that we may analyse any possible forgone perceptual variations in definition and in doing so become aware of the perceptual flaws of our current theories, regardless of how grand and profitable their advance forms may have become, or how foolish we philosophers may look in doing so. 

What perspective are our current definitions of time hiding from us? To begin to answer this question consider on a superficial level what violation to our ordinary standards of proof it would make to describe the apparent continuity of existence as a resulting from an explainable cause or interaction rather than as something that simply is. Let us say for example as the result of a microscopic interaction inherent in everything physical, but also in what we originally defined/divided as empty or non-physical – some kind of interaction that structures a dynamic spectrum of changes that result in an unfolding universe. Now the violation would be little from the point of view of our (a) induction as human being’s, indeed we wouldn’t even know the difference since we inherently (a) induct/recognise time only in its resulting form: continuing/passing, not as what causes that continuing/passing. But with regards to our translation of continuity/time into (b) theory/description, well it denies this possibility altogether in the initial definitions we make of it. We have placed a rather important stress on aligning our (a) induction with our (b) description when it comes to time, and that has led us only down the road of resulting time only, which I will clearly illustrate through a historical account of its definitional construction. Now of course if there was any obvious cause to time, effectively prior to the time we know as a result, we would have treated it’s definition very differently - and such divisions wouldn’t have been made as they are now. But because we cant manage to locate ‘an inherent time property’, and because of the way we are construing reality according to our first divisions of space, time, change and physicality, we have completely dismissed the possibility of it existing altogether - even in theory - and in doing so forgone the opportunity of explaining temporal unfolding from a non-resulting perspective/status. I am going to clearly demonstrate this most reasonable dismissal of time as possibly being explained in terms of having a causal mechanism, could have been premature.

For the conceptual purposes of understanding the distinction between resulting and non-resulting time, I think the ontological relation between the two can be compared to that of the macroscopic and microscopic laws of physics. It is generally assumed that Einstein’s laws of relativity are correct for a macroscopic context, so the question then becomes how do we explain the microscopic world so as to arrive at the precision Einstein has granted us in the macroscopic world? It is almost as if we already know the final answer: the result - and we just have to work out how to reach it… We know time as a result, but much like with the microscopic world, the non-resulting state may be quite different to the laws we have surmised about it from its resulting state. Quite possibly one of the flaws of our search for the reality of time in the microscopic field would be that we expect it to have the dimensional qualities we have assigned within the macroscopic context, which is its resulting state, when rather what we should be looking for is perhaps more like some kind of property inherent in the physical and non physical of such interaction as to explain resulting time. 

If we look to back to see when theories of non-resulting time were dismissed we need to look quite far indeed. Consider Aristotles interpretation of the mentioned first divisions, he claimed that: 
““Time is the measure of change” [Physics, Chapter 12], but he emphasized “that time is not change [itself]” because a change “may be faster or slower, but not time…” [Physics, chapter 10]. For example, a specific change such as the descent of a leaf can be faster or slower, but time itself can not be faster or slower.”​[1]​ 

The divisions made here in (b) expression appeal to our (a) induction. There does seem to be a general passing of time, and quite differently individual rates of change for specific physical locations in it. We imagine that if we could stop time, regardless of the rate of change of any individual object, say a Ferrari travelling at 300 kilometres per hour, that the Ferrari would also be stopped, because change occurs within time. This is the Aristotelian division and it is nothing short of a genius alignment between (a), (b) and (c), but it dually dismisses an alternative view of time, specifically the notion that the leaf will fall at a certain speed, or the Ferrari will travel at 300km, because of a functional, local, temporal interaction which is defining what change will be at each location. So it would be impossible to stop time across an area, the leaf and the Ferrari at the same time, because it governs change at each location according to certain interactions, which vary across locations. This is a possibility under non-resulting theories of time, but has been forgone in Aristotle’s division. If we altered that temporal physicality/non-physicality I mentioned before (this is an easy way to picture a theory of non-resulting time) at each location that is the leaf, or the Ferrari, or their surrounding non-resulting time properties, the leaf or Ferrari would not, could not, obey the three second rule we geometrically map when we measure passing, which is an interpretation of time as a result. Of course there is no such physical/non-physical time interaction that I can yet alter, but you can at least begin to see the possibility, albeit superficially, such ideas have been forgone by dividing time and change in the Aristotelian division.

2.0 	Einstein’s Resulting Time Interpretation

Sir Isaac Newton was able to demonstrate through the use of Aristotle’s divisions that space and time are absolute with respect to change, most notably through his bucket experiment. A quarter century later Albert Einstein presented a more complex interaction between these first definitions/divisions and overturned Newtons conclusion, however what he shared with Newton was a construction that denied non-resulting time from its beginning, even his final controversial result doesn’t reach a non-resulting perspective of time despite changing what we thought the relationship, and definitions, between Aristotles divisions were. To mathematically account for the traditional division of time in his theories Einstein adds a fourth quadrant so x,y,z and t.​[2]​ (That time is treated “as a fourth spatial dimension” was originally held to be controversial.​[3]​) This t as a mathematical dimension accounts for a selected array of specific changes of physical distribution by providing an ordered temporal correlation for their operation. In effect Einstein counts the continued existence of (c) at each location of it. Einstein then uses the results of those temporal-geometrical changes in resulting time, to define resulting times properties and its ontological status. 

In order to explain the qualities of time as a dimension conjoined with the spatial dimensions, Einstein adopts (1) the Aristotelian divisions mentioned above, (2) the equation speed equals distance over time - which in many respects is a favourite child of the parent Aristotelian division and why I find it odd people accept he is able to over turn them in some respect, and finally having defined his backdrop landscape via (1), and the behaviour of the change within it via s=d/t (2), Einstein inserts (3) the speed of light - which he decrees is the fastest speed at which a physicality can under go change having the special quality of being constant. Einstein is thus able to demonstrate that time is relative, within the (1)(2) relationship of Aristotle’s initial divisions, by application of (3) to them: If change has a maximum, constant, speed in/of any period of time - being that of travelling light – the so called cosmic speed limit - then any deviation in the time taken for that light to travel between two points, let us say by gravitational curvature – the mass of a sun - will effect the time that light takes to travel in time – which thus suggests time itself is not absolute with respect to physical things undergoing change, which is to say it doesn’t pass uniformly at all locations light may pass through - and is not a constant nor instant occurrence, but is as intimately altered / bent as the spatial dimensions are, by such dense locations as the mass of a sun, and is as ordered as change is. In effect time passes at precisely the maximum speed of change, and this allows us to describe time as relativity theories do. Indeed my first observation is that it follows perfectly that proof exists for this theory with regards to time precisely because all that has happened is a t, a geometrical counter of resulting time, has been inserted into a physical phenomena - that of change, and the landscape situation light encounters i.e. that of the pull of gravity from a sun - thus change describes time by the limits of change itself. This in one sense is very manipulative and in all honestly, and respect, only proven right because Einstein has taken an (a) induction, assigned it a counter as t, and (b) described it qualities in terms of a gap in that count, by those terms only - of course it follows the time taken would be altered as the spatial is. What I am suggesting here is that Einstein knew he would be right with regards to defining time, before they even did the experiment with the Hubble, because his equations didn’t actually explain time, other than in terms of resulting time, they just predicted the inserted t count which altered, orderly, with each spatial coordinate of physical change: time as a ‘dimension’ could be/must have been acted on. Now I don’t think there is anything wrong with Einstein’s or for that matter Newtons summation’s given their construction, in terms of spatial revelations they are unquestionable; the definition of genius, but the issue brought to light here is that there very construction may be defining us from ever really knowing time, other than as its result, and we have prescribed its qualities in relativity theory solely from placing a counter description, that of its resulting state, upon itself.

“In a merged form of relativity theories Einstein’s equations present the gravity field as a deformation of space-time geometry caused by the matter distribution in it… on the left side of Einstein’s equations we have an expression describing the space-time geometry, and on the right side an expression describing the matter distribution.”​[4]​ 

If we simply remove time from the left side of this equation, then relativity theory says we simply stop time, but I think this conclusion is false – all we are stopping is counting resulting time, time as its end state, but time is not just a dimension. I suggest it matters little whether the fourth coordinate, t, is really there or not – we can even leave it there now we understand it only describes time from its resulting form, we understand our definitions of time are restricted to a resulting interpretation. We don’t have to account for time in this way anymore because we are moving to the cause of that resulting time, being non-resulting time, just like the microscopic world must result in the form of the macroscopic world and its laws, we going start talking about time on the right hand side of that equation, towards what Hawking recently dismissed as being possible: ‘a theory of everything’. 

3	Non-Resulting Time: Perspective & Future

Nobel Laureate David Gross asks ‘How could we have a theory of physics where we start with something in which time is never mentioned?’​[5]​ This is a very real problem for physicists but I am going to argue a very direct answer to this question exists - being to view time from a causally superior ontological position. We know now that this shift in explanation does not disrupt the standard of proof we have for resulting theories of time, because those laws are isolated to describing time as a dimension, as its end form. In this manner we could quasi-solve the conflict between previous notions of resulting time by showing that in the light of this new perspective there are no solutions because there are no real problems. The conflict between say SR and Presentism would only arise because they are giving different notions in examination of time’s surface state only, and it follows that their inconsistency is irrelevant if the surface actually has a depth that gives rise to that surface, since that depth would provide the true reality of how the surface occurs, and thus two conflicting surface arguments are not going suffice. To illustrate this point, I ask the question: Is rain the same everywhere? We can break down our familiar responses as follows. Presentist Argument: Rain is Rain, it’s same everywhere. Ontological Reasoning: “Rain” is describing the nature of “Rain” thus the induction itself of “Rain” is explaining what itself is. B theorist/SR Argument:  “Rain” is different in different locations because atmospheres vary at different locations. Ontological Reasoning: “Rain”, the nature of what it is, is being described in terms of something “Rain” interacts with, however it is still being considered in terms of its resulting state; “Rain” and what it interacts with ‘the atmosphere’. Non-Resulting Argument: Clouds cause rain, this occurs from an interaction within them that varies from showers to heavy rainfall depending on that interaction. Ontological Reasoning: Rain is no longer used itself to describe itself, whether with something else after the fact of definition (B theorist) or only from the end state itself (A theorist). Thus we have quasi solved the confliction, if we can establish a non-resulting theory that explains time like the interactions in clouds cause rain. Furthermore it answers the initial question; How could we have a theory of physics where we start with something in which time is never mentioned? Because we would now be talking about clouds instead of rain, we could be talking about non-resulting time instead of time, if we put forward a serious theory of non-resulting time that accounted for resulting time. But how could we do achieve this?

We consider time as uniform, in the sense that it has the same ontological properties with regards to its subject self – time, across all locations in which it exists, but that it varies within the context of that defined subject self: i.e. time is time everywhere, but the time varies at different locations. We are not considering its subject self as something that has different ontological properties in each location, because certain interactions necessarily entail this to be the case, and that resulting time thus varies in accordance with this. But how would such an interaction that defined non-resulting time as having varying properties at varying locations, but ultimately resulting as a dimension, be possible? Well how is the macroscopic and microscopic laws of physics possible for the same reality? Consider again this quotation: 

“In a merged form of relativity theories Einstein’s equations present the gravity field as a deformation of space-time geometry caused by the matter distribution in it… on the left side of Einstein’s equations we have an expression describing the space-time geometry, and on the right side an expression describing the matter distribution.”​[6]​ 


We now understand time on the left hand side is time as a dimension, its resulting form, and as I said we can leave it there if you like, but what if we also insert an extra equation on the right hand side, one that defines a causal reason for dimensional time on the left, an interaction which correlates with both dimensional time and with matter distribution? Then we would be talking in terms of clouds and not rain. An equation that is entwined with matter distribution to the point that it becomes clear that a spectrum of possible changes exists for matter and non matter alike, that plays out its different shades in different locations so as to ultimately allow both the speed of light or something faster at one end and empty space or dark matter at the other. A spectrum of possible interactions that results in the dimensional time we have only previously adopted to ultimately explain a process universe. 

I think there have been echoes voiced for the described distinction I have presented in this paper in the work of other philosophers and scientists, indeed some might be quick to point out Hugh Prices ‘Archimedes Standpoint/View from Nowhen’ or Ilya Prigogine’s work on entropy and the direction of time, but these ideas of time are in another field altogether, they do not go back to the foundations of time’s definition and illustrate by reduction that its more likely to be the construction of our scientific definition of time which is hiding times reality. Rather such works utilize a post B theory analysis, they accept scientific definition and try to bridge between Einstein’s B theory time and other theories of physics, such as the entropy, so then to reveal more insights into the nature of time itself than B theory offers. I think this method ultimately shares the same source problems through definition that B theory has, and they aren’t going to get really get anywhere using that method, even a scientific breakthrough is likely to require us to go back to the start and reinterpret how we have defined time. 
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